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In one of his essays the late humorist, Robert Benchley, spoke ofhis diminishing
confidence during college that he could fill an inside straight in poker. The people
who try to predict major influenza outbreaks go through a similarevolution. While a
cyclic recurrence ofthe same influenza strain can be reasonably predicted on the basis
ofmorbidity and serological data which reflect the remaining numberofsusceptibles
in a population, the prediction of a major pandemic due to a new strain is fraught
with uncertainty. This is because the events leading to the emergence of an entirely
new influenza strain are both unknown and unpredictable. I agree with Beveridge [1]
that major influenza mutants probablyarise somewhere in the remote stretches ofthe
Eurasian land mass and represent a recombinant between a human and an avian or
animal strain ofinfluenza. Indeed, my own theory is that the nomadic tribes wander-
ing with their cattle and otheranimals overthe great Mongolian land areas set outby
Genghis Khan in the 13th century may be a source of new strains. The close and
prolonged intimacy between man, animals, and birds in such a setting would be
conducive to the emergency ofa hybrid strain. On arrivalforprovisions in one ofthe
cities like Ulan Bator the new strain might initiate a pandemic that could spread
across China to Hong Kong where it would be recognized and identified by WHO
sentinel laboratories. Sailors and soldiers of the U.S. and other areas then might
become infected in Hong Kong and bring the new strain back to their homelands.
The Asian outbreak of 1957 and the Hong Kong outbreak of 1968 were first
recognized in Hong Kong. Though these new strains were quickly identified and
vaccine production begun immediately it was still 5-6 months before the first few
million doses were ready for use-too little and too late to prevent the spread ofthe
epidemic.
These facts were well known to medical and public health authorities when swine
influenza produced a small outbreak involving 500 recruits at Ft. Dix, New Jersey.
On serological grounds the strain resembled that responsible for the great pandemic
of 1918 in its surface antigens but there was no way to measure its virulence by direct
antigenic comparison since influenza virus itselfwas not isolated until 1931 by Shope
[2]. While it seems likely that the human influenza virus of 1918 initiated anepidemic
in pigs at the Cedar Rapids, Ia. Swine Show, Oct. 1918, and then persisted in this
species until 1931 [3,4] and even until the Fort Dix isolation 1976, the virus may have
lost virulence for humans in this process. The presence of antibody to this strain in
about 20 percent of pigs in the United States [5] and the occasional sporadic
infections ofhumans exposed to such pigs support the view that it has persisted until
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now. The major question was whether the outbreak in Ft. Dix recruits represented a
mutant (or hybrid) of the swine virus which had acquired enhanced virulence and
capacity for spread or whether the close and prolonged exposure of recruits in
training simply facilitated the spread of a swine influenza strain of low virulence to
man. The specter of the 1918 outbreak hung like the sword of Damocles over this
decision. Those old enough to remember or those who have read accounts of this
catastrophic outbreak of 1918 on mankind and its history [2,6] can well understand
why the Presidential Advisory Committee felt that every effort to prevent such an
event, however improbable, should be pursued. Ifhalfofmankind were to become ill
and 20 million die as in 1918, an investment of$135 million or more in an immuniza-
tion program would have seemed like a small price to pay for an insurance policy
against an unlikely but catastrophic occurrence. Antibiotics would help cut the
secondary bacterial deaths but many died too soon in 1918 to have benefited from
antibiotics even if they had been available, and many personis died of primary
influenza pneumonia which does not respond to antibiotic therapy. Five American
experts on influenza estimated the probability of an epidemic as 0.10 (range
0.02-0.25) which if it occurred would cause 56 million cases of swine influenza and
50,000 excess deaths [7]. In her challenging paper in this issue of The YaleJournal of
Biology and Medicine, Ms. Begley points out that the swine flu program failed
because no epidemic occurred. This is not a failure in my view. I think most of us
would be willing to take out a major medical insurance against a 10 percent chance of
a disabling or fatal illness within the next year and not consider it a failure simply
because we did not fall ill or die. Should we think otherwise for the population as a
whole? In my view the decision to proceed with a large scale immunization program
had good justification whatever additional political gain President Ford or others
had in approving it.
As Begley points out, there were also other problems in the implementation ofthe
program. These included the figure she quotes that only 45 million ofthe 210 million
at risk received the vaccine, although later data from the National Influenza Center
indicate that 31.6 percent of persons age 18 or over had been immunized in the U.S.
by February 2, 1977. In addition, there was the poor potency of the vaccine in
children, the occurrence of a few fatalities in the aged, the reports of some 200 cases
of the Guillain-Barre syndrome, the failure to incorporate the swine flu program into
an overall immunization program (or even to include A/Victoria and B/Hong Kong
influenza strains in the vaccine), the lack of effective communication with and
financial support for local public health authorities, and finally the problems of
liability insurance. There can be no argument about the existence of these difficulties.
The haste to immunize a nation with a single vaccine may have overshadowed all
other considerations. In addition, the so-called "High Risk Group"-those over age
65-were not really at high risk to swine influenza since most of this group already
had antibodies to swine influenza as a result of natural infection in the period
1918-1928 when this virus was active. Further, the unique feature of the 1918
outbreak was the high mortality inyoung adults. In another paper [8] it is shown that
99.1 percent of persons age 18-25 in the Yale community lacked antibody to swine
influenza, 98.3 percent of those age 26-35, 55 percent ofthose 36-59 years old, and
none of those over age 60. Thus young and middle-aged adults were really the high
risk group to infection, disease, and death if a 1918-like epidemic had occurred. A
high mortality rate in infants and the aged would also have been expected.
Two questions might be raised: First, would Begley and others have judged the
program a failure if a major pandemic had begun in the fall of 1976? It is likely that
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(1) a great upsweep ofpublic participation in immunization would have occurred; (2)
children and young adults would have received booster doses; (3) the cases of
Guillain-Barre, which is usually a benign and transient syndrome, would have been
regarded as a lesser risk than the high morbidity and mortality of an influenza
pandemic; (4) President Ford, Congress, the medical authorities who advanced the
program, the pharmaceutical manufacturers who made the vaccine, and the physi-
cians and public health personnel who administered it would have been widely
acclaimed for their vision and action. The epidemic did not occur and for that I am
grateful. But one must ask a second question-what have we learned from it? At the
least we have learned of the many medical, legal, political, and financial problems
that arise in any mass immunization program and perhaps ways to avoid or modify
them in the future. Hopefully, we have learned the need for more careful planning, of
combining such programs with other immunization programs and of using all
prevalent viruses in the vaccine strain. Hopefully, we and the public have learned that
any injection, even sterile salt water, into several million people willevoke complaints
of some type from some. The need for careful surveillance of both immunized and
nonimmunized persons in future programs is apparent. The public should be clearly
informed that a certain number of people will have fever, or Guillain-Barre syn-
drome, or die whether they get vaccine or not. This number should be publicized.
Only when the baseline is exceeded should the possibility of a vaccine reaction be
considered. The excitement of any injection may push incipient or borderline heart
patients into fatal ventricular fibrillation. Any mass immunization carried out in a
very short period will compress the reactions to them into a short time period so they
are much more obvious. Modern communication will make their occurrence widely
known. Perhaps we have learned that haste does make waste and that sins of
commission are worse than those ofomission. I, forone, would notview the swine flu
immunization program as a total failure. Instead I would regard its costfirst as an
insurance premium against a pandemic that thankfully did not occur and secondas
the price of tuition in the school of experience.
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